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A DEFENSE OF STARE DECISIS
By H ERT C. KAUFMAN*
The term "Stare Decisis" means to adhere to precedent and not to
unsettle things that are settled. It is supposed to embody a rule of common
sense, to wit: Rules of Conduct should be settled so society will know how
to conduct itself in the future. Laws are nothing but rules of conduct bind-
ing on the members of society as such. With this in mind, is the rule of stare
decisis a good or bad rule? Is it sometimes good and sometimes bad? To
answer these questions we must look into the history of the rule and then
apply the rule of common sense.
By the doctrine of stare decisis, the common law gives authority and
weight to judicial decisions upon a given issue of law; judicial decisions
become authoritative sources of the rules of law by which the legal rights
and obligations arising from a particular mode of conduct are determined.
Stare decisis in England has real meaning. The House of Lords has
taken the position that once it has decided a point of law, that decision is
conclusive, not only on all inferior tribunals, but binding on itself. Black-
stone declares: I
Precedents and rules must be followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust; for
though their reason be not obvious at first view, yet we owe such a deference
to former times as not to suppose that they acted without due consideration.
Is it not presumptuous of the members of a high court to refuse to fol-
low the rule of stare decisis and thus be at the mercy of latter day members
of the same court who again refuse to follow the rule and overrule the last
decision of their own court?
For Mr. Justice McReynolds of the United States Supreme Court, the
common law was a protector of society because it was certain, and prece-
dent was not to be overruled. His dissenting opinion in the Gold Clause
Cases does not include some extemporaneous remarks: "The Constitution,
as we have known it, is gone. It seems impossible to overestimate the result
of what has been done here today. The guarantees to which men and women
heretofore have looked to protect their interests have been swept away."
If a layman had spread in front of him at one time all the decisions of
the Supreme Court since Marbury v. Madison, he would not only lose his
respect and reverence for the Court, but would be convinced that his wel-
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fare and liberty were ultimately at the mercy of a self-conceived super-
legislature instead of a court of law. In the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo,
what is more important to remember is that stare decisis is the "every-day
working rule of our law."
Decisions on constitutional questions should be dealt with in the same
manner as any other decision under stare decisis. The rule being designed
to prevent uncertainty and inconvenience, constitutional constructions can
hardly be changed without terrific hardship and disadvantage to the public.
The Supreme Court has, in fact, adopted stare decisis in constitutional
cases, but the problem is to what extent the Court will follow the rule and
refuse to be wiser and more learned than the Court in the past with dif-
ferent members. Mr. Justice Roberts felt that the tendency of the Supreme
Court to overrule its former decisions
... [I] ndicates an intolerance for what those who have composed this court
in the past conscientiously and deliberately concluded, and involves an as-
sumption that knowledge and wisdom resides in us which was denied to
our predecessors.
The reason for my concern is that the instant decision, overruling that
announced about nine years ago, tends to bring adjudications of this tri-
bunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day
and train only.2
The rule of stare decisis rests on an obvious sense of justice as well as
convenience. Law to be obeyed or followed, must be known; to be known
it must be fixed; to be fixed, what is decided today must be followed tomor-
row, and that is all stare decisis means.
Lawyers, in advising their clients and trying to practice law intelli-
gently, use their talents to looking up precedents. The lawyer seeks a safe
harbour where his client can be safely anchored. Every lawyer yearns for
security in an age of doubt and confusion. Thus, the lawyer clings with all
his heart to the rule of stare decisis-without the rule he is lost. He cannot
practice law for he cannot advise his clients. He knows that there can never
be equal justice under law if a rule is applied in the morning but not in the
afternoon. Stare decisis serves to take the capricious element out of law
and give stability to our society.
If the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is the supreme
law of the land, by what right does the Court reinterpret the supreme law
of the land. What limitation, if any, is there on the Court to prevent fre-
quent interpretations of the same question, and how are men to know what
the supreme law of the land is and how long it will remain the supreme law
of the land? '" 1
2 Dissenting in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666, 669 (1944). The overruled case to
which he refers was Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
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Much unrest exists in our society because our state appellate courts as
well as the United States Supreme Court refuse to pay more than lip service
to the time-honored rule of stare decisis. Where will this lead? A break-
down in law and order will result, for men no longer can respect courts that
cannot make up their minds. It seems that our courts are following a trend
that ignores the rule of stare decisis. Each case is decided the way the par-
ticular court thinks it should be decided with little or no regard for prece-
dent. In fact, precedent only tends to embarrass some courts, for they are
put to the task of explaining it away. Law is supposed to be a rule of reason
binding on the members of the community as such. It is true, when the
reason for the rule changes, so should the rule. But when reason and logic
have not changed and expediency is the only reason to change a rule, courts
should stay with precedent.
The judge is one of the basic cornerstones of the process of justice. In
deciding a case, to quote Justice Cardozo, he
[S]hould draw his inspiration from consecrated principles; he is not to
yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence, but
must exercise a discretion tempered by tradition, methodized by analogy,
disciplined by system and subordinated to the primordial necessity of order
in the social life.
Back of precedents are the basic juridical conceptions which are the
postulates of judicial reasoning, and farther back are the habits of life, the
institutions of society, in which these conceptions had their origin, and
which, by a process of interaction, they have modified in turn.
Logic and history, custom and utility, and the accepted standards of
right conduct, are the forces which singly or in combination shape the pro-
gress of the law. Which of these forces shall dominate in any case must
depend largely on the comparative importance of the social interests that
will be thereby promoted or impaired.
Of course, there is sound reason for applying the rule of stare decisis
strictly in cases involving property rights, contracts, torts, probate and
wills. Society, in cases such as these, has a right to know what the law is,
that the law is fixed and will not be overturned or reversed by a court that
is second guessing. The advantages to society as a whole can be met only
by a wholesome respect for the doctrine of stare decisis.
In the field of constitutional law, Washington said in his farewell
address: 3
If in the opinion of the People the distribution or modification of the Con-
stitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an
amendment in the way which the Constitution designates. But let there be
no change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may be the in-
s 1 RicHARDsoN, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, Farewell address
of President George Washington, 1796 213, 220 (1896).
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strument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments
are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance in perma-
nent evil any partial or transient benefit which the use itself can at any
time yield.
Jefferson wrote: "There is no danger I apprehend so much as the con-
solidation of our government by the noiseless, and therefore unalarming,
instrumentality of the Supreme Court."
Disrespect for precedent turns our government into one of men instead
of a government of laws. Government of men will kill our American way
of life as we know it. We must fight to retain a government of laws so that
the State will ever be the servant, not the master. Our Supreme Court must
not amend our Constitution by judicial decision. Furthermore, a decision
by the Supreme Court interpreting a provision of the Constitution is inte-
grated into and becomes part of the Constitution itself, and any different
interpretation thereafter placed upon it must, to be valid, be by amend-
ment in the manner provided in the Constitution.
The biggest issue confronting the American people today is rarely
mentioned. The issue is whether the people shall be governed by a written
Constitution which is subject to change only by their will or whether that
Constitution shall be rewritten by Supreme Court justices to suit their
personal or ideological whims. This is the same issue which caused a stir
in 1937 when the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared that Con-
gress should enact a law which would have the effect of increasing the num-
ber of justices by six so he could appoint new judges who would conform
to his views. Congress rejected the proposal, but Mr. Roosevelt was able a
few months later to "pack" the Court anyhow through the vacancies that
occurred. Many of the professors and deans of the law schools, and cer-
tainly many of the "self-styled liberals" of those days felt then, and many
still feel, that the Supreme Court should change the Constitution at will.
A notable exception is Alfred J. Schweppe of Seattle, former dean of the
law school of the University of Washington, and at present one of the
editors of the American Bar Association Journal. He writes in a recent issue
of U.S. News & World Report:4
I absolutely reject the idea that the Supreme Court has the power to re-
write the Constitution according to its concepts of sociological or economic
change. That is what the amendatory process is for. I do not accept Justice
Douglas' blunt view that the amendatory process is "too slow" as anything
but a violation of the oath to support the Constitution in all of its parts.
The reference was to a speech by Justice Douglas in 1949 in which he said:
"It must be remembered that the process of constitutional amendment is
4 Pro and Con in Growing Debate over Powers of Supreme Court, U.S. News & World
Report, October 24, 1958, pp. 110-13.
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a long and slow one." This was precisely FDR's argument in the "Court
packing" fight.
It is not improper to criticize the decisions of the Supreme Court. Its
justices have often conceded this point themselves. Last August 23rd the
chief justices of 36 states approved a report which said:5
We are not alone in our view that the [Supreme] Court, in many cases
arising under the Fourteenth Amendment, has assumed what seems to us
primary legislative powers .... We do not believe that either the framers
of the original Constitution or the possibly somewhat less gifted drafts-
men of the Fourteenth Amendment ever contemplated that the Supreme
Court would, or should, have the almost unlimited policy-making powers
which it now exercises.
By a 36-8 vote, the state chief justices adopted this unprecedented report.
The committee of justices, headed by Maryland's Chief Judge Frederick
W. Brune, had worked for a year on this report. Said Brune:'
It has long been an American boast that we have a Government of laws and
not of men. We believe that any study of recent decisions of the Supreme
Court will raise at least considerable doubt as to the validity of that boast.
... Frequent differences and occasional overrulings of prior decisions in
constitutional cases cause us grave concern as to whether individual views
of the members of the court [on] what is wise or desirable do not uncon-
sciously override a more dispassionate consideration of what is or is not
constitutionally warranted.... It is our earnest hope. . . that the great court
exercise to the full its power of judicial self-restraint by adhering firmly to
its tremendous, strictly judicial powers and by eschewing, so far as possible,
the exercise of essentially legislative powers.
When the Court has once interpreted a provision of the Constitution, it
has exhausted its jurisdiction under our constitutional system. If this be
not true, then we have a government of men, and the Constitution itself will
be a hollow shell to be changed as often as the members of the Court desire
to change it. If a provision of the Constitution, as interpreted by the Su-
preme Court, be thought to be wrong and in the public welfare, let the
Constitution be changed by amendment as provided in the document itself.
Many think this process of amendment is too cumbersome, but our found-
ing fathers wanted just this form of amendment to take care of the im-
patient members of our society and to give time for mature consideration
by all of our people. The founding fathers never dreamed of amendment by
judicial fiat, thinking that the Constitutional clause providing for amend-
ment was too clear to admit of a Court amending the Constitution by
judicial legislation.
5 What 36 State Chief Justices Said About the Suprene Court, U.S. News & World Report,
Oct. 3, 1958, pp. 92, 102.
6 Ibid.
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Judges, being human, are tempted to legislate judicially; they must be
restrained by our supreme and appellate courts and these courts in turn
may only be restrained by their own good sense or by appropriate statutory
or constitutional legislation.
The rule of stare decisis carries out Lord Coke's belief that "the known
certainties of the law is the saftie of all," and the welfare of organized
society is served best by close adherence to this conception. The ancient
custom of following precedents helps us to hold fast to our basic principles
of justice and equity, to establish knowable rules of conduct, to administer
even-handed justice, and to maintain a uniformly consistent development
of our legal system. How then to have our courts adhere to the rule of stare
decisis? The problem must be solved to a great extent through education.
We must start in our law schools. Young lawyers must be given more in-
struction in the history and background of stare decisis; the reasons for its
use and the benefits to society. For all of our judges come from our schools
of law and what they learn and respect in law school is later set forth in
their decisions. A short but comprehensive course on the doctrine of stare
decisis would be in order for our schools of law to teach. The law school
can well teach its law students that traditionally the function of the judici-
ary is not the making of law but the ascertainment and application of
existing law to the facts of the case at hand. Its function is not to change
the law as its wisdom may direct, but to enforce the law as it exists.
Law, as we know it, has its basic roots in the customs and beliefs of the
people. It is not the product of human will but is a reflection of the common
conviction. Law must have stability and certainty. Any growth of the law
must be ordered growth, legislative in character not judicial legislation.
The legislature, acting for the people and directly responsive to the will of
the people, is the logical and traditional agency through which error in an-
nounced law may be corrected or such law revised in accordance with public
sentiment. The courts, with little or no public control over their determina-
tions as to what is best for public welfare, are not designed for the demo-
cratic accomplishment of change--quite to the contra, the courts are the
guardians of order, the protectors against disregard of the established rule
of conduct. Public confidence in, and acceptance of, the judicial system
demands careful attention to this judicial responsibility.
When does the doctrine of stare decisis not apply? Blackstone in his
commentaries said:'
For it is an established rule to abide by former precedents, when the same
points come again in litigation: ... because the law in that case being sol-
emnly declared and determined, what before was uncertain, and perhaps
7 1 BLACKSTONE, COmmENTARIES *69-70.
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indifferent, is now become a permanent rule, which it is not in the breast of
any subsequent judge to alter or vary from according to his private sen-
timents: .... Yet this rule admits of exception, where the former deter-
mination is most evidently contrary to reason; much more if it be clearly
contrary to divine Law. But even in such cases the subsequent judges do not
pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresen-
tation. For if it be found that the former decision is manifestly absurd or
unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law, but that it was
not law; that is, that it is not the established custom of the realm, as has
been erroneously determined.
Thus, it can be seen that the exception to the rule is strictly limited and
should be so limited because of the temptation on the part of judges to
ascribe to themselves a superior knowledge or wisdom over their prede-
cessors on the bench. Judges, being human, will chafe and be unhappy over
the discipline of stare decisis. This, however, is a just and proper discipline
because, as has been heretofore pointed out, chaos would result if the rule
is not followed. Our modern type of civilization demands that this salutary
rule govern the conduct of our courts.
It is sad to think that in these times stare decisis needs a defense. The
rule has been disregarded more in the past 25 years than in all the rest of
recorded legal history. The tragedy is that this means we have rule of men
rather than rule by law. It means a breakdown of government when judges
can disregard precedent and declare law according to their sentiment and
whim.
In conclusion, this article is a small, feeble voice crying in the judicial
wilderness, trying to assist our courts from becoming lost in the jungle of
the law.
Those things which have been so often adjudged ought to rest in peace.
Feb., 195;91
